We show how the occurrence of a civil war has heterogeneous effects on the level of GDP, using case-study, synthetic control and large-N panel-data approaches. We first discuss the relation between these methods and then provide lower and upper estimates of the economic effect of civil war. Although, on average, the incidence of internal conflicts has a negative effect on the GDP level, it is very often insignificant. More importantly, however, both methods display a wide variety of individual separate effects, and in a large number of countries civil war has either no effect or a positive and significant impact on the prospect for economic growth.
Introduction
Civil wars are the dominant form of violence in the contemporary international system. From 1960 to 2010, more than 20% of nations experienced at least ten years of civil war.
The number of active conflicts peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflict across Sub-Saharan Africa, where a third of countries had active civil wars during the mid-1990s. Civil war is more frequent in poor countries and can further weaken their prospects for economic development. An extensive literature has investigated the effects of civil war on economic growth across countries.
Surveys on the economic costs of conflict are provided by Gardeazabal (2010) , Skaperdas (2011 ), World Bank (2011 , De Groot (2013), De Groot et al. (2012) and Smith (2014) .
We contribute to a very active area of academic debate in recent years by showing how civil wars have heterogenous, country-specific effects on economic performances. Most of the economic studies on civil war are all-country all-year estimations, which conceal the high degree of heterogeneity in countries' response to conflict shocks. In fact, on the one hand, civil wars can cause economic catastrophes, as in Uganda during the military dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971-79, when up to half a million people were killed and the per capita GDP declined by 40% within one decade. On the other hand, however, civil wars are not identical, and the category encompasses different circumstances and realities; in fact the number of battle deaths in many civil war countries is comparable to the number of homicides in stable and prosperous economies, like Russia or South Africa (Cramer, 2006) . Social welfare can even improve in the absence of a central state when the government is exploitative and oppressive (see Powell et al., 2008) , thus challenging the very notion of a negative impact.
We focus on 27 case studies to identify particular responses that are averaged out in large-N quantitative studies, where conflict is assumed to produce the same outcome in very different economies. We use a counterfactual approach -the synthetic control method -and compare the post-conflict GDP trajectories of conflict-ridden countries with the trajectories of combinations of otherwise similar but unexposed countries. A common critique of the cross-country literature is the presence of unmeasurable time varying omitted variables, such as the quality of the institutions, that affect both economic growth and the likelihood of war. This method mitigates the bias by accommodating for unobservable confounders. We also examine the relationship between the case-study, synthetic control and large-N panel-data approaches and provide a range of estimates of the effect of civil war. In particular, we show that both models estimated from panel data and models where treatment effects are estimated by comparison of a treated case with a synthetic control can reveal a great degree of heterogeneity in the economic effect of civil war. In a number of cases, countries actually perform better in the presence of conflict, relative to previous periods of peace.
Our case-study analysis shows that, on average, civil war reduces the GDP level by 9.1%. Yet this approach also reveals a great degree of heterogeneity in the way economies react to conflicts: we find that only 12 of the 27 cases show a significant negative effect of war on the GDP level. When we turn to the panel data analysis, we find that estimated impact of conflict on the GDP level is overall insignificant. However, the point estimates obscure the wide range of possible responses to conflict; in fact, by relaxing the homogeneity restrictions in the panel analysis, we find that individual separate effects of civil war for each country range from -33% to +32% of the GDP.
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The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on the economic costs of war, including the methodological issues involved in the calculation. Section 3 discusses the relationship between panel and synthetic control estimators. Section 4 describes the synthetic control method and presents the implemented experiments by region. Section 5 presents the results of the panel data analyses. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
War devastates lives, health, and living standards both directly in the form of battle deaths, and indirectly through increased rates of diseases. At the same time, war could destroy obsolete physical infrastructure and some of the social and political institutions that inhibited development in the first place (Van Raemdonck and Diehi, 1989; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) . In fact, a number of theoretical studies suggest that war can have both positive and negative impacts on subsequent economic growth, through a variety of channels. Theories on the positive effect of war hinge crucially on the existence of improvements resulting from war participation, in particular institutional changes and technological innovations. Tilly (1992) argues that, starting from 990 AD, major mobilizations for war stimulated states' expansion and consolidation, and created new forms of political organization. Likewise, Cramer (2006) recalls how changing technological demands for warfare in Europe in the 19th century forced states to find new funding sources.
In a shift from small mercenary forces to larger domestic military forces, European states had to create taxation institutions to mobilise war finances. Wars were followed by a successful transformation of failed states, and the most successful states had a growing tax base, such as England and Prussia. In fact, "much of the institutional apparatus of modern government and economic management has its origin in the compulsion to finance wars" (Cramer, 2006, p.178) .
Seminal empirical studies by Organski and Kugler (1977) and Organski (1981) analyze the economic effects of WWI and WWII on European Countries. The authors suggest that winners and neutrals are only affected marginally by the conflict and that developed societies devastated by war recovered in one generation the levels of performance they would have had in the absence of conflict. This phenomenon is called the "Phoenix Factor" and underpins two key factors: obsolescent plants and industrial equipment are replaced by more advanced and efficient infrastructures; at the same time, attitudinal factors, in particular the motivation to rebuild and the greater effort exerted by a defeated population, increase the pace of recovery. Taken together, these mechanisms can lead to greater post-war productivity.
Another popular argument for the existence of a positive post-war economic trajectory is offered by Olson (1982) . He argues that rent-seeking activities by special interest groups hamper economic growth. These so-called distributional coalitions resist the adoption of new technologies and a more efficient allocation of production factors, thus undermining capital formation and slowing economic development. Civil wars destroy the existing social order and weaken or uproot special interests that block socio-economic changes, and thus contribute to liberating a country's productive resources and improving the level of welfare provision. Chan (1987) , among others, explores the experience of the Asian Pacific-rim countries and find support for this mechanism.
A related argument posits that after war less predatory political regime could emerge.
Most of the civil wars usually breaks out in countries with dysfunctional states that are not only unable to provide basic public goods, such as infrastructures and schools, but may themselves be a major hurdle to economic development. Oppressive and exploitative governments can in fact depress economic development below a level achievable without any government at all. Leeson (2007) and Powell et al. (2008) compare Somalia's relative economic performance when the country had a government with its extended period of post-1991 war and anarchy. They both find that a number of Somalia's development indicators have improved during its period of statelessness. The results are explained by the existence of public corruption and government rent-seeking in the pre-war period. The emergence of anarchy opened up opportunities for advancement not possible before the collapse of the state. Therefore, when a good government is not an option in a country's institutional opportunity set, anarchy could be more desirable for its economic development (Leeson, 2007) . Van Raemdonck and Diehi (1989) review additional theoretical arguments on the positive effects of war on economic growth. They suggest that war can i) enhance government research and development efforts that spawn spinoffs for the economy; ii) encourage the exploration of new resources or raw material; iii) prompt better transportation and communication facilities that yield benefits after the war is over; iv) improve managerial and organisational skills; and v) redirect resources to peacetime industries that were ignored during the war. Finally, using an integrated economic model which accounts for multiple forms of conflict, a recent work by de Groot et al. (2015) finds that whereas developing countries lost as a result of conflict, developed countries seemed to benefit from it.
Yet, as Van Raemdonck and Diehi (1989) point out, the theoretical arguments for why wars have negative economic effects are inverted versions of the previous mechanisms. War destroys transportation facilities and productive human capital, including economic skills, while large-scale killings create demographic distortions and military demobilisation leads to labor surplus. Other economic distortion stems from the servicing of debts, the lack of investments, higher levels of military spending for deterrence, and the disruption of international economic linkages, such as trade (see Smith, 2014 , for an overview). Collier (1999) , possibly the most cited article on the cost of civil wars, finds that during civil wars GDP per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2%. The decline is partly because war directly reduces production and partly because it causes a loss of the capital stock due to destruction, dissaving, and portfolio substitution of foreign investors. Blomberg et al. (2004) use a structural VAR model to show that negative shocks to GDP due to internal or external conflicts yield much larger and longer-lived effects than those obtained from a negative shock due to terrorism. Using an event-study methodology, Chen et al. (2008) analyze a cross-section of 41 countries and find a substantial drop in per capita income in conflict countries during war and a failure to make subsequent progress in key areas of social and political development comparable to countries that did not experience civil war. A number of articles also investigate the spillover effects on neighbouring countries and trading partners (e.g. Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Fosu, 2003; Kang and Meernik, 2005; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005; Koubi, 2005; De Groot, 2010) .
There are several methodological difficulties involved in quantifying the economic costs of conflict, reviewed in Smith (2014) . Cerra and Saxena (2008) use impulse response functions and show that the immediate effect of a civil war induce a reduction of 6% points in GDP, although almost half of that loss is recovered after about 6 years.
2 Yet, the long-run estimates are imprecise and allow for the possibility of a zero long-run effect.
Moreover, in the event of a long civil war, such as in Angola or Sri Lanka, the negative effects on growth can be expected to compound over time and it is not clear to what extent output can be expected to partially recover in the long run, as it does in the impulse response to a theoretical one-time shock (see also Skaperdas, 2011) . Another methodological issue hinges on the coding procedure: Cerra and Saxena (2008) use a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in all civil war-years (as opposed to the start years when they analyse other shocks such as banking crisis). Mueller (2012) shows how this leads to an underestimation of the output response to civil war, which ends up being the most devastating type of crisis.
Country experiences in terms of growth of course vary widely and aggregate studies conceal a deal of heterogeneity in countries' response to conflict. A small body of recent works compare outcomes between neighboring areas within the same country with different exposure to conflict, using micro level data (Davis et al., 2002; Miguel and Roland, 2011; Brakman et al., 2004; Lopez and Wodon, 2005 ). Yet these works are case studies and independently from ours, which examine the economic effects of civil war on 20 countries, the case we are concerned with.
3 There is an alternative, panel time-series based approach introduced by Hsiao et al. (2012) , which can be used to provide a counterfactual. Although this approach seems to have been less widely used, it has a number of attractive features.
In the following section we discuss the relationship between the synthetic control and panel approaches and suggest a method, based primarily on a Chow test, to assess the significance of the measured synthetic control effects. We then compare panel and synthetic control estimates of the economic cost of civil war.
Synthetic control method and panel model
The synthetic control approach arises from the microeconometric literature where it is natural to try and measure the treatment effect by comparing the treated cases with untreated controls who are similar in all respect but treatment. The approach fits less well in a time series context where as Abadie et al. (2015) note the use of statistical inference is difficult because of the small sample nature of the data, the absence of randomization, and the fact that probabilistic sampling is not employed to select sample units. Thus rather than giving confidence intervals for their estimates Abadie et al. (2015) use what they term placebo studies. Abadie et al. (2010) motivate the approach with a factor model.
There is a separate approach to measuring the treatment effect used by Hsiao et al. The synthetic control method is described in more detail in Abadie et al. (2010 Abadie et al. ( , 2015 , but suppose that we have a sample of i = 1, 2, ..., N units, in time periods t = 1, 2, ..., T with focus variable y it . The target, unit 1, is subject to the intervention at time T 0 , with post intervention data t = T 0 + 1, T 0 + 2, ..., T 0 + T 1 , with T = T 0 + T 1 . The other N − 1 control or "donor" units are not subject to the intervention and are not affected by the consequences of the intervention in unit 1. The effect of the intervention is measured as
To determine the weights w i let x 1kt be a set of k = 1, 2, ..., K predictor variables for y 1t , with the corresponding variables in the other units given by x jkt , j = 2, 3, ..., N.
These variables are averaged over the pre-intervention period to get x lies outside the support of the data for the other countries, which raises a problem for the synthetic control method, which relies on finding an average that is similar, but not for the prediction method. Note that the fact that regression methods can give negative weights comes as no surprise if one interprets the procedure as involving prediction using global factors. Suppose Hong Kong before integration is largely driven by global factor A, the US by factors A and B, and Japan largely by factor B; then the US minus Japan provides an estimate of factor A, which drives Hong Kong.
Following Abadie et al. (2010, p.495) we can write the model in (1)
where y N it is the estimated value in the absence of intervention and c it = 1 if i = 1 and t > T 0 , zero otherwise. Were we to then model y N it by a country specific intercept and global factors, f t plus an idiosyncratic error, we would obtain
which is a standard heterogeneous factor augmented panel model. There are a variety of ways of estimating the unobserved factors, f t . Conditional on estimates of the factors, the d it can be obtained as the prediction errors from estimates of (2) for each country up to T 0 . The significance of the d it can then be estimated by the usual Chow predictive failure test. We can allow for more countries to be subject to intervention, by defining c it = 1, if a civil war is in progress and c it = 0 if not.
In their study of terrorism using a model like (2) (2006) correlated common effect estimator which proxies the unobserved f t by the cross section averages (weighted or unweighted) of the observed variables. This involves estimating
This brings out the similarities to the synthetic control and Hsiao et al. (2012) approaches, where the cross-section averages are used to provide the predicted counterfactual. Where it differs is that c t , the average prevalence of conflict is included, which allows for contagion effects. The averages may be weighted or unweighted, and if weighted may
give zero weights to some countries like the synthetic control.
If we assume homogeneity of λ i in (2) we get
with α t = λ f t . This is a two way fixed effect model, a static version of equation (1) of If we further assume that the effects of conflict are homogeneous over time and country so that d it = β, we have a standard panel model of the cost of conflict
In our example, which we discuss in more detail below, we will consider a balanced panel i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T with data for y it which is the log per-capita real GDP and c it = 1 if a civil war is taking place in country i in year t and c it = 0 otherwise.
The sample is made up of those that had civil wars (but not other sorts of wars) and those that had no wars at all. 6 There is an issue about whether other covariates should be included, since the civil war may have effects on these other variables and attributing this effect to variations in the other covariates may 'over-control' and under-estimate the total effect of civil war. Pesaran and Smith (2016) discuss this issue. We do not include other covariates although the argument can be extended to allow for them.
Case studies
Consider an outcome such as per capita GDP, which has been observed before during and after a conflict. We want to compare the observed outcome for the conflict years with a hypothetical counterfactual, which gives the country's per capita GDP in absence of a conflict. To compare the trajectory of the GDP for a country affected by a civil war with the trajectory of a control group, we need a suitable control unit with the same characteristics of the unit exposed. Yet, when the units of analysis are aggregate entities, like countries, a suitable single control often does not exist, and therefore a combination of control units offers a better compromise.
As shown in section 3, the synthetic control method is based on the premise that 5 We confine ourselves to static models to bring out the similarity between the panel and synthetic control approaches, since the latter does not include lagged dependent variables of the treated cases. 6 We exclude cases where the country was subject to interstate or extra-systemic wars.
in the absence of a civil war, the evolution in terms of GDP per capita of the treated region would be given by a weighted average of the potential comparison units that best resemble the characteristics of the case of interest. The gap between the conflict-ridden country and its artificial counterfactual and the cumulative stream of gaps can identify the yearly effect as well as the cumulative effects of civil war on subsequent economic performances over extended periods of time. To select the countries into the donor pool, we focus only on the outcome variables in the pre-treatment period. Therefore the vectors of pre-conflict characteristics for the country at war and the treated units include only pre-treatment levels of per capita GDP.
We use civil war data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset. Accordingly, a civil war is defined as "a conflict between a government and a nongovernmental party".
We use both cases where there is no interference from other countries and civil wars where "the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments" since these instances are very frequent in contemporary internal conflict. We exclude countries with extra-systemic armed conflicts -i.e., conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory, and interstate armed conflicts -i.e., between two or more states. Real per capita GDP is taken from Penn World Table dataset.
Our pool of experiments is made up of countries meeting the following conditions: (i) the treated country and the control group have no missing information on the outcome variable in the 25-year-long sample period as we require 15-year pre-war observations to calibrate the synthetic control and 10-year post-war observations to forecast the long-run effect of the civil war; (ii) the treated country experienced a civil war at the latest in 2002, as we focus on a 10-year post-war window; 7 (iii) in case of multiple and subsequent civil wars, we select the first one in chronological order. By imposing the above conditions, we end up with 27 case studies. 8 Following these criteria, we had to drop a number of very interesting cases, e.g., the 1997 civil war in Eritrea because the GDP is only available from 1992 or the 1987 Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in Uganda, as there is not a sufficient number of pre-treatment observations without the presence of other civil wars.
The pool of potential comparison economies consists of countries which did not experience any civil war in the 25-year-long sample period (i.e., between 15 years before and 10 years after the onset of a civil war). As one valid concern in the context of this study is the potential existence of spillover effects, we exclude from this pool the countries sharing borders with the treated units.
Given the potential of heterogeneity across regions, we divide our 27 treated countries into six groups i.e. Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-saharan Africa, Latin America and Europe.
9 For the sake of brevity and to show the heterogenous effect of civil war, this section will only briefly cover four case studies, one in the MENA region (i.e., Algeria), one in Oceania (i.e., Papua New Guinea), one in Asia (i.e, Sri Lank), and one in Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e., Uganda). We refer the reader to the online appendix for the remaining countries. Algeria shows the case of a level shift, and a one-off temporary effect on the GDP. Uganda displays a situation in which conflict causes the growth rate to deteriorate, and thus a steady divergence from their artificial counterfactual following the onset of the civil war.
9 Given its level of development and its aspiration to join the European Union, we have treated Turkey as European.
10 Section 1.1 in the appendix display the weights of each state in the synthetic control. For example, the weights reported indicate that per capita GDP in Algeria prior to the civil war in 1991 is best reproduced by a combination of the Bahamas (0. In Papua New Guinea the divergence between the solid and the dotted lines after the outbreak of the conflict indicates that the country at war outperformed its synthetic counterpart and that civil war had a positive impact on its subsequent GDP levels. In Sri Lanka the treated countries and the synthetic control behave similarly in both the pre-treatment period and the post-treatment period, showing virtually no divergence and therefore no clear effect of civil war on economic growth (see Figure 1 ).
------[Figures 1 in here] ------
The appendix contains the remaining cases. In particular, Figure includes Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
11 Overall, the divergence between the solid and the dotted lines after the outbreak of the conflict indicates that civil war produces very heterogeneous effects on the GDP, and these vary across countries and over time.
To assess whether there is a significant difference between the outcomes of the treated, y it , and the control group,ȳ S it , during civil war years, we perform a Chow test to estimate d ih , the wartime forecast error in 11 The start date of the treatment in Spain and the UK corresponds to heightened tensions between the governments and the ETA and IRA, respectively, in terms of battle related deaths, as coded by the PRIO/UPPSALA dataset. The results we obtain with the case study on Spain are consistent with early findings by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) , who however measure the effects of ETA on the economy of the Basque region only.
where c ih are separate dummies for each of the war years,
The d ih are the prediction errors for the war years, the w it will be the pre-intervention differences between the treated case and the synthetic control and will be zero for the war years, when the errors will be captured by d it .
Even if the mean of the errors was zero,
, the variance may be changed by the war, producing significant forecast errors. In fact, we estimate model 4
and assuming that the errors are normally distributed we test the restriction
This is the same null as a Chow predictive failure test. Table 1 period, whereas the difference between Sri Lanka GDP and its synthetic counterpart is insignificant in most of the conflict years.
------[ Table 1 in here] ------ Table 2 summarizes the results from the case study analysis. The mean effect is the coefficient of the civil war dummy (which takes on the value 1 when a country has a conflict, and 0 otherwise) in an equation where the dependent variable is the log GDP gap between the country at war and its artificial counterpart. In fact, we run an equation similar to 4, but we do not use separate civil war year dummies, which allows us to obtain a mean effect. We also report the p-value of this mean effect and the p-value of the Chow test, which corresponds to the one displayed at the bottom of each panel containing the individual Chow test. Finally, we report the Standard Error of the Regression (SER), to
show how well the pre-war model fits the data.
------[ Table 2 in here] ------
We find that 17 of the 27 cases show a negative effect of war on the GDP level, of which 12, according to the Chow test, are statistically significant at conventional levels.
On the other hand, 4 out of 10 cases exhibit a positive and significant impact. In terms of magnitude, Table 2 indicates that the average impact of conflict on the GDP level is around -9.1%, even though this is imprecisely estimated (the standard deviation of all βs is 0.19). 12 This is different from the 17% drop found in the study of Costalli et al. (2014) , which uses a different sample (20 case studies), a different pre-intervention period (10 years) and additional predictor variables to construct the synthetic control (i.e., investment share, trade openness, population growth rate and secondary school enrollment rate). However, considering common cases only, we obtain an average impact of 12.8% against the 17.2% of Costalli et al. (2014) .
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Panel data analysis
To link the results obtained from the synthetic control method to the panel data analysis, we now estimate the economic costs of war using the empirical specification in equation (3). In particular, we assume that the effects of conflict are homogenous over time and across country. The model takes the following form
12 Note that the countries at war omitted from the analysis show on average a larger per capita GDP than the economies included in our study. Therefore, if we had also included these countries, the heterogeneity in the estimated effects of conflict would have possibly been even more pronounced.
13 Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2015) use only pre-treatment values of the outcome variable and given the similarity of the specification, they reach a finding similar to ours, i.e., the size of the effect of war is very heterogeneous, although they do not report individual estimates, and only look at the GDP level, thus making a direct comparison unfeasible.
where y it is the (log) of real per capita GDP in a country i at time t. Table 3 displays our estimates of equation (5). We use two balanced samples, one over the full period 1960-2010 (models i to iii), in which however we need to drop three countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Djibouti, as we do not have data for the first decade, and the other over the period 1970-2010 (models iv to vi), which includes the full set of countries. In order to compare the output gaps obtained from the synthetic control method with a balanced panel data estimation, we use the same pool of control units selected in the synthetic control method procedure (models i and iv). We also use a restricted sample, with models (ii) and (v) estimating equation (5) only for the 27 casestudies who experienced civil wars. Finally, in models (iii) and (vi) we run a mean group (MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) , which produces consistent estimates of the average of the individual country-specific parameters β i .
The models of Table 3 are semi-logarithmic regression, in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita GDP, therefore the interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the control variable is that of a percentage change in per capita GDP. The estimated impact of a civil war is never significant at conventional levels, with the exception of model (iv), where it is around -6.4%. Although most of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero, this should come as no surprise given the extreme heterogeneity in countries' reaction to conflict shocks. Recall that table 2, reporting the country-specific effects estimated by means of the synthetic control, suggests that 10 of out 27 countries exhibit a positive, rather than negative, average response to civil war.
------[ Table 3 in here] ------Given that we use a large dataset from 1960 to 2011, and T = 51 is large, we can estimate individual separate effects of civil war for each country and relax the homo- Table 3 by means of the Mean Group estimator. As is made clear, the effect of war on the per capita GDP is insignificant at conventional levels. Note that, although closely related, the panel data analysis and the synthetic control methods are not expected to produce exactly the same estimates. Firstly, we are allowing forc t , the correlated common effect estimator, in the panel data analysis, to capture unobserved factors, which is however excluded in the synthetic. Secondly, in the panel data analysis the comparator groups income isȳ t , while this isȳ and 2(b) respectively). As we can see, again, there is a wide range of possible responses to conflict shocks, ranging from -33% (Sierra-Leone) to +32% (Nicaragua and Egypt) in the GDP level. This further reinforces the presence of a highly heterogeneous impact of conflict on economic performances, which is variegated and it is often positive rather than negative.
------[ Figure 2 in here] ------
Conclusions
The economic impact of conflict has been a very active area of academic debate in recent years. Despite an extensive literature on this topic, the very direction of the effect -whether it is negative, positive or null -and its size are still contentious. Wars have heterogenous, country-specific effects on economic outcomes and there has been considerable controversy in economics about the relative merits of qualitative case studies for particular countries and quantitative large-N studies for many countries. Case studies can take account of a lot of country specific history but are a sample of one, often selected for its salience which may make it unrepresentative of other cases. Large-N studies can be generalized but ignore the country specific heterogeneity by, for instance, imposing common coefficients. This paper attempts to provide lower and upper estimates of the effect of civil war on the level of economic activity by linking panel data analyses, case studies and synthetic control methods, and by proposing a host of inferential methods. We first use a counterfactual approach and compare the evolution of the real per capita GDP for countries affected by a conflict with the evolution of an artificial control group. We find that in many cases, civil wars did not have an obvious negative impact on the economic development of exposed countries every year. On average, however, we find that civil war reduces the GDP level by 9.1%, even though this is imprecisely estimated. We then compare these results with a panel data analysis and find that the incidence of internal conflicts has mostly insignificant effects on the GDP level. Yet, by relaxing the homogeneity restrictions, panel data also reveals a surprising wide array of positive and negative effects of conflict on the economy of afflicted countries. Overall, both methods display a variety of individual separate effects, and in a number of countries civil war has either no effect or a positive and significant impact on the prospect for economic growth. Substantial uncertainty on the effect of war on the economy remains, ensuring that the subject will be a fertile area of study for the foreseeable future.
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